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Executive Summary 
The Enteric Diseases Epidemiology Branch (EDEB), Division of Foodborne, Bacterial, and 
Mycotic Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases is 
responsible for surveillance of bacterial enteric pathogens. National case surveillance 
encompasses two systems administered outside EDEB: the National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System (NNDSS), which is clinical case-based, and the Public Health Laboratory 
Information System (PHLIS), which is a laboratory isolation-based reporting system. The 
laboratory-based system alone includes data on important pathogen characteristics data such as 
serotype for Salmonella, Shigella, and Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli isolates. 
Serotype information for these pathogens is crucial for surveillance, outbreak detection, and 
investigation. PHLIS also includes some pathogens that are not formally nationally notifiable, 
but may be notifiable at the state level. In addition EDEB primarily collects information for 
botulism, typhoid fever, cholera and other Vibrio illnesses, as well as for Shiga toxin-producing 
E. coli, non-O157. Information in this report includes case and isolate counts in 2005, as of 
March 2007; the numbers may have changed compared with previous publications of 2005 
surveillance data. 
The number of reported cases of diseases under surveillance is a vast underestimate of the true 
burden, because most episodes of disease never reach the reporting systems. Many ill persons 
do not seek medical care, medical practitioners may not order the tests to make a specific 
diagnosis, and laboratories may not conduct the appropriate tests to isolate the causative 
pathogens. Some pathogens are not included on the list of nationally notifiable diseases (e.g., 
Campylobacter and Yersinia) and are not included in this report, though individual states may 
require reporting and collect surveillance data. The completeness of surveillance data is 
variable. The Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) conducted more 
intensive surveillance in ten sites in 2005; more information is available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/. 
Many illnesses are not included in any surveillance of individual cases, in part because there 
are no standard clinical tests to detect them. Examples include illnesses due to enterotoxigenic 
E. coli and due to enterotoxins produced by Bacillus cereus, Clostridium perfringens, and 
Staphylococcus aureus. For such conditions, reports of foodborne outbreak investigations 
provide the best available surveillance information. Foodborne outbreak reports are available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/. It should be noted that all surveillance reports from 
state and territorial departments of public health to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) are voluntary. 
Each year, EDEB summarizes surveillance results in multiple formats, including letters to state 
and territorial epidemiologists and public health laboratory directors, reports in the CDC 
publication Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), and publications in peer-
reviewed scientific journals. More information about these documents is available at the end of 
this report in the following sections: Sources and Contacts for Bacterial Foodborne and 
Diarrheal Diseases, Publications by the Enteric Diseases Epidemiology Branch, 2005, and CDC 
Internet sites for Foodborne and Diarrheal Diseases. 
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This report is the third in an annual series summarizing results from nationally notifiable 
bacterial foodborne and diarrheal diseases case surveillance systems. A description of the 
surveillance systems is included to explain the differences between these systems and why they 
sometimes have different case counts for the same disease entity (see the Data Sources and 
Background section of this report for more information). The specialized sentinel site 
surveillance system, FoodNet, provides complementary information for a range of foodborne 
infections of public health concern from 10 sites. FoodNet annual summaries are available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/reports.htm. 
Looking forward, EDEB is actively involved in advancing the nation’s surveillance for 
foodborne and diarrheal diseases. CDC-wide integrated surveillance systems are under 
construction, which may make national surveillance for many types of diseases more efficient. 
We are working to make more surveillance tools available to state and local public health 
personnel and more surveillance information available to public health workers, policy makers, 
and the general public through combined reports and information available on the Internet. 
The case and isolate counts for eight diseases and pathogens for 2005 are presented in Table 1-
1 and described on the following pages. 
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Table 1-1. Case and isolate counts for foodborne and diarrheal diseases and pathogens, 2005 
Pathogen/Disease 
Botulism
E. coli O157:H7 
Comments 
 Includes foodborne, 
wound, infant and other 
types 
Nationally 
Notifiable 
Yes 
Yes 
NNDSS*   
No. cases 
135 
2,621 
Data Source 
  PHLIS†   EDEB‡ 
No. isolates  No. cases or isolates 
NA 145 
2,368 NA 
E. coli, Shiga toxin-producing, 
non-O157
Yes 501 224 348 
Hemolytic uremic syndrome Yes 221 NA NA 
Listeriosis Yes 896 NA NA 
Salmonella Typhi (typhoid fever) Yes 324 348 143§ 
Salmonella, non-Typhi 
(salmonellosis) 
Shigella (shigellosis) 
Includes >2,400 
Serotypes 
Includes 4 subgroups 
Yes 
Yes 
45,322 
16,168 
35,836 
8,520 
NA 
NA 
Vibrio cholerae, toxigenic Includes O1 and O139 
serotypes  (that causes 
cholera)  
Yes 8 NA 12 
Other Vibrios (vibriosis) Some species may not be 
pathogenic 
No NA NA 546 
*NNDSS (National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System) 
†PHLIS (Public Health Laboratory Information System)
‡EDEB (Enteric Diseases Epidemiology Branch) 
§ Preliminary data 
Botulism 
A total of 145 cases of foodborne (18), wound (28), infant (96), and other types (3) of botulism 
were reported to the EDEB botulism surveillance system, including three deaths (attributed to 
foodborne botulism [2] and unknown [1]) and four outbreaks (defined as two or more cases as a 
result of persons ingesting the same food).   
Escherichia coli O157:H7 and Other Shiga Toxin-Producing E. coli 
Escherichia coli O157:H7 has been nationally notifiable since 1994. In 2000, the Council for 
State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) passed a resolution in which all Shiga toxin-
producing E. coli were made nationally notifiable under the name Enterohemorrhagic 
Escherichia coli or EHEC; national surveillance for EHEC began in 2001. Reported infections 
with the most well-known pathogen in this group, E. coli O157:H7, has increased annually 
since becoming nationally notifiable to a peak number of 4,744 in 1999. The steady increase in 
the number of cases was due in part to an increasing ability of laboratories to identify this 
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pathogen. Coordinated efforts by regulators and industry have been effective in reducing 
contamination and illness related to ground beef. During 2004, 2,544 cases were reported 
through NNDSS. 
The National E. coli Reference Laboratory at CDC provides serotyping and molecular 
characterization of virulence factors as a service to state public health laboratories. In 2005, 
CDC received 348 isolates of Shiga toxin-producing E. coli, non-O157. Isolates originated 
from 39 states and included 29 different O groups. The three most common O groups were O26 
(24%), O103 (17%), and O111 (13%). A total of 501 cases of Shiga toxin-producing E. coli 
non-O157 were reported to NNDSS. 
Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome (HUS), Post-diarrheal  
HUS is defined by the triad of hemolytic anemia, thrombocytopenia, and renal insufficiency. 
The patients reported in national notifiable diseases surveillance include only those with 
antecedent diarrheal illness. The most common etiology in the United States is infection with a 
Shiga toxin-producing E. coli, principally E. coli O157:H7. About 8% of persons infected with 
E. coli O157:H7 develop HUS. Of the 221 cases of HUS reported in 2005, 75% occurred in 
children younger than age 10 years.   
Listeriosis 
Listeriosis became nationally notifiable in 2000. Surveillance is conducted through NNDSS. 
Forty-five states and one territory reported at least one case, for a total of 896 cases. 
Salmonella Typhi (Typhoid Fever) 
Infection with Salmonella serotype Typhi leads to typhoid fever. The number of cases of 
typhoid fever (324 in NNDSS) has been relatively small and constant, mostly associated with 
travel outside the United States. S. Typhi isolates are reported through the National 
Salmonellosis Surveillance System; 348 isolates were reported in 2005.  
Salmonella, Non-Typhi (Salmonellosis) 
A total of 35,836 non-Typhi Salmonella isolates were reported in 2005. The national rate was 
12.2 per 100,000 population. Similar to other years, children younger than age 5 years 
accounted for 20% of Salmonella isolates. About 10% of isolates came from persons in each of 
the second through fifth decades of life, with lower proportions from persons in later decades of 
life.   
The thirty most common serotypes of Salmonella in 2005 represent 82% of all Salmonella 
isolates. The four most common serotypes in 2005 (Typhimurium, Enteritidis, Newport, and 
Heidelberg; 52% of all isolates) have been the most common serotypes since 1995, except for 
2004 when serotype Javiana replaced Heidelberg as the fourth most common serotype. Serotype 
Typhimurium has been the most commonly isolated serotype since 1997, though Enteritidis was 
a very close second in 2005. Serotypes Typhimurium and Enteritidis have both declined 
substantially (28% and 34%, respectively) since 1995; the total number of Salmonella isolates 
has also declined during this period, though not as substantially as serotypes Typhimurium and 
Enteritidis.   
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Shigella (Shigellosis) 
Shigella transmission occurs via the fecal-oral route. Most Shigella sonnei infections occur in 
young children and are associated with crowding and poor personal hygiene. Daycare centers 
have been implicated in many S. sonnei outbreaks. 
A total of 10,484 Shigella isolates were reported to PHLIS in 2005. This represents a 
stabilization of Shigella rates from the sharp decreases that occurred in 2004. The national 
rate was 3.5 per 100,000 population, based on 2005 census population estimates for the 
United States. Similar to previous years, children younger than age 5 years accounted for 
28.2% of all Shigella isolates. About 34.2% came from persons aged 5–19 years, and 26.6% 
from persons aged 20–59, with lower proportions from persons in later decades of life. 
Of the 10,484 isolates, 9,420 (89.7%) were subgrouped. The relative proportions of the 
different subgroups remained similar to previous years, with subgroup D (S. sonnei) accounting 
for the largest percentage of isolates (74.4%), followed by subgroup B (S. ﬂexneri, 13.6%), 
subgroup C (S. boydii, 1.2%) and subgroup A (S. dysenteriae, 0.5%). 
Cholera and Non-Cholera Vibrio 
In 2005, 12 patients with toxigenic V. cholerae were reported. Five patients were hospitalized 
and no deaths were reported. No isolates of toxigenic V. cholerae O139 were identified. All 12 
patients were infected with toxigenic V. cholerae serogroup O1. Infection was acquired during 
international travel for five isolated cases. Exposure to domestic seafood was the source of 
infection for four patients. Source of infection was unknown for three cases.   
Other Vibrio isolates (excluding V. cholerae serogroup O1 and O139) were not nationally 
notifiable in 2005, and not all states report cases. States bordering the Gulf of Mexico have a 
reporting agreement with CDC; others do not, but are encouraged to report cases. In 2005, 578 
Vibrio isolates from 546 patients were reported to the Cholera and Other Vibrio Illness 
Surveillance System. Among patients for whom information was available, 232 (46%) of 506 
were hospitalized and 40 (8%) of 485 died. V. parahaemolyticus was isolated from 218 (40%) 
patients, and was the most frequently reported Vibrio species. Of the 546 patients infected with 
V. parahaemolyticus, 23% were hospitalized and 1% died. V. vulnificus was isolated from 121 
(22%) patients; 90% were hospitalized and 26% died.        
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Expanded Surveillance Summaries for Selected Pathogens and 
Diseases, 2005 
The following bacterial foodborne and diarrheal diseases case surveillance summaries for 2005 
are derived from individual reports sent to state and territorial epidemiologists and public 
health laboratory directors. They are compiled here to provide more detailed text, tables, and 
figures. An expanded summary of E. coli O157 infections, listeriosis, typhoid fever, and 
hemolytic uremic syndrome surveillance (HUS) data is not included in this report; more 
comprehensive surveillance data concerning these are available in FoodNet reports at 
http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/. Only a few select tables and figures are included here from the 
Salmonella Annual Summary, 2005 and the Shigella Annual Summary, 2005. These complete 
reports are available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/phlisdata. 
Botulism 
The botulism surveillance case definition is available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/EPO/DPHSI/casedef/botulism_current.htm. Botulism is a rare but serious 
paralytic illness caused by a neurotoxin produced by the bacterium Clostridium botulinum. 
There are three main forms of botulism. Foodborne botulism is caused by eating foods that 
contain the botulism toxin. Wound botulism is caused by toxin produced from a wound 
infected with Clostridium botulinum. Infant botulism is caused by consumption of spores of the 
Clostridium botulinum organism, which then grow in the intestine of infants and release toxin.  
All forms of botulism can be fatal. Because many people can eat a food contaminated with the 
botulism toxin, every case of botulism suspected to be foodborne is considered a public health 
emergency. 
EDEB staff members are available to consult with health department and physicians 24 hours a 
day. CDC also maintains the only source of antitoxin used to treat botulism in the United 
States. The request for consultation and release of antitoxin by health departments and 
physicians is the basis of surveillance for most cases of foodborne and wound botulism. States 
report cases of infant botulism to EDEB on a yearly basis; therapeutic human antitoxin licensed 
for treatment of infant botulism is available from the California Department of Health Services.   
Suspected botulism cases should be reported immediately to local or state public health 
officials, who then should call the CDC Emergency Operations Center at (770) 488-7100; CDC 
will immediately connect callers with an on-call botulism consultant. For consultation on 
suspected infant botulism occurring in any state, the Infant Botulism Treatment and Prevention 
Program of the California Department of Health Services should be contacted at (510) 231-
7600. 
A total of 145 cases of botulinum intoxication were reported to CDC in 2005 (Tables 2-1 and 2-
2). Among the 18 cases of foodborne intoxication, toxin type A accounted for 7 (39%) cases, 
toxin type B 1 (5%) case, and toxin type E for 10 (56%) cases (Table 2-3). The median age of 
patients was 35 years. Two deaths were reported. There were 4 multi-case outbreaks. They were 
caused by fish (type unspecified), stinkfish, stinkhead, and suspected leftovers containing several 
ingredients including salmon, respectively. 
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There were 96 reported cases of infant botulism in 2005 (Table 2-4). Toxin type B accounted for 
52 (54%) cases and toxin type A for 44 (46%) cases. The median age of patients was 16.5 weeks; 
no deaths were reported.  
There were 28 reported cases of wound botulism in 2005 (Table 2-5). Toxin type A accounted 
for 25 (89%) cases, toxin type B 2 (7%) cases, and unknown toxin type 1 (4%) cases. All cases 
occurred in injecting drug users. The median age of patients was 44.5 years; no deaths were 
reported. 
There were 3 reported cases of botulism of other or unknown source in 2005 (Table 2-6). Toxin 
type F accounted for 2 (67%) cases, and type A accounted for 1 (33%) case. One toxin type F 
case was associated with adult intestinal colonization and exposure to gardening soil. The 
sources of the other type F case and the type A case were unknown. The case patients were 56, 
84, and 74 years of age respectively; one death was reported. 
Table 2-1. Summary of cases of botulism reported to the Botulism Surveillance System, 
2005 
Type  Cases Median age Sex Toxin type Comments 
Foodborne 18 cases 
 (2 reported 
deaths) 
Infant 96 cases 
(No reported 
deaths) 
Wound 28 cases 
(No reported 
deaths; 2 
without 
information) 
Other, unknown 3 cases 
 (1 reported 
death) 
35 years 7 (39%) type A 4 multicase 
outbreaks 
(range: 1–82 10 (56%) male 1 (5%) type B 
years) 
10 (56%) type E 
16.5 weeks 44 (46%) type A . 
(range: 2–60 53 (55%) male 52 (54%) type B 
weeks) 
44.5 years 25 (89%) type A 
(range: 28–57 23 (82%) male 2 (7%) type B 
years) 
1 (4%) toxin type 
undetermined 
74 years 3 (100%) male 1 (33%) type A 
2 (67%) type F 
(range: 56–84 (Clostridium baratii) 
years) 
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Table 2-2. Cases of botulism reported to the Botulism Surveillance System, by state and 
type, 2005 
State/District Foodborne Wound Infant Other Total 
Alaska 8 8 

Alabama  1 1 

Arizona  1 1 

California 3 24 42 69 

Colorado  1 1 

Delaware  2 2 

Florida  1 1 

Idaho  1 1 

Illinois  1 1* 2 

Kentucky 1 1 

Louisiana  1 1 

Massachusetts 1 1 

Maryland  5 5 

Michigan 1 1 

Missouri 1 1 

Montana  1† 1 

North Carolina 1 1 2 

New Hampshire 1 1 

New Jersey 2 9 11 

New Mexico 1 1 

Nevada  1 1 

New York City 4 4

Oklahoma 1 1 2 

Oregon  2 2 

Pennsylvania 1 11 12 

Texas 1 1* 2 

Utah  3 3 

Virginia  1 1

Washington  4 2 6 

Total 18 28 96 3 145 
*Unknown source 
†Adult intestinal; gardening soil 
11 
Table 2-3. Cases of foodborne botulism reported to the Botulism Surveillance System, by 
month, 2005 (N = 18) 
Month State Age (years) Sex Toxin Type Vehicle Death 
January Massachusetts 75 Male A Chili with rice and lotus root No
 Michigan 82 Male B Unknown† Yes 
May California 30 Male A “Pruno”‡ No 
July New Jersey* 45 Male E Fish No 
 New Jersey* 16 Female E Fish No 
 Oklahoma 14 Female A Home-canned venison stew No 
August Alaska*1 27 Female E§ Stinkfish No
 Alaska*1 33 Male E Stinkfish No
 Alaska*1 37 Female E§ Stinkfish No
 Alaska*1 69 Male E Stinkfish No
 Alaska*2 19 Female E Stinkhead No
 Alaska*2 23 Female E Stinkhead No
 Alaska*2 47 Female E Stinkhead No
 Alaska*2 1 Male E Stinkhead No 
September North Carolina 64 Female A Homemade nutritional juice No 
November California* 82 Male A Leftovers containing salmon Yes 
California* 17 Male A Leftovers containing salmon No 
Pennsylvania 63 Male A History of homecanning No 
*Cases involved in multicase outbreaks  
1 Group 1 multicase outbreak in Alaska 
2 Group 2 multicase outbreak in Alaska 
†Multiple suspected sources due to history of improper food storage  
‡Homemade alcoholic beverage 
§Toxin type derived from epidemiologically-linked case 
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Table 2-4. Cases of infant botulism reported to the Infant Botulism Treatment and 
Prevention Program, by month, 2005 (N = 96) 
Month State Onset Age (weeks) Sex Toxin Type Death 
January California 7 Male B No 
 California 29 Male A No 
 California 12 Female A No 
 New Jersey 50 Female B No 
New York City 11 Male B No
 Pennsylvania 13 Female B No
 Pennsylvania 16 Male B No
 Utah 20 Female A No 
February California 18 Male B No 
 California 34 Male A No 
 California 43 Female A No 
New Jersey 12 Female  A No 
 Pennsylvania 28 Male B No
 Pennsylvania 20 Male B No
 Utah 16 Male A No 
March California 14 Male A No 
 California 8 Male A No 
 Delaware 39 Female B No 
 Florida 34 Female A No 
 Maryland 25 Female B No 
 Oklahoma 10 Female A No 
 Pennsylvania 20 Male B No 
April California 12 Female B No
 Pennsylvania 16 Female B No 
May California 24 Male B No 
 California 6 Female A No 
 California 3 Male A No 
 Illinois 12 Male A No 
 Kentucky 12 Male B No 
 Maryland 28 Male B No 
 Maryland 13 Male B No 
 New Jersey 15 Female B No 
 New Jersey 12 Male B No 
New York City 22 Female B No
 Pennsylvania 24 Male B No
 Pennsylvania 21 Female B No
 Utah 10 Male A No 
 Virginia 21 Male B No 
June California 26 Male A No 
 California 19 Male B No 
 California 23 Female A No 
 California 28 Female B No 
 California 19 Male A No 
 California 20 Male A No 
13 
Month State Onset Age (weeks) Sex Toxin Type Death 
 Delaware 40 Male B No 
Louisiana 3 Male B No 
 Nevada 60 Female A No 
 Pennsylvania 22 Male B No 
July Alabama 5 Male B No 
 California 16 Male A No 
 California 19 Female B No 
 California 30 Male A No 
 California 6 Female B No 
 New Hampshire 17 Female B No 
 New Jersey 21 Male B No 
 New Jersey 17 Male B No 
August Arizona 13 Male A No 
 California 4 Female B No 
 California 20 Female B No 
 California 16 Male B No 
 California 10 Female B No 
 California 20 Male A No 
 Maryland 3 Male B No 
 New Jersey 4 Male B No 
 Washington 31 Male A No 
September California 24 Female A No 
 California 23 Female B No 
 California 14 Male A No 
 California 20 Female A No 
 California 4 Female A No 
 Oregon 16 Female A No 
 Oregon 19 Female A No 
Texas 10 Male A No 
October California 17 Female A No 
 California 46 Female A No 
 California 9 Female A No 
 California 6 Male A No 
 California 30 Male A No 
 Idaho 16 Male A No 
 New Jersey 4 Female B No 
New York City 19 Male B No
 Pennsylvania 2 Female B No
 Pennsylvania 17 Female B No 
November California 8 Female A No 
 California 9 Female A No 
 Colorado 8 Female A No 
New York City 6 Female B No 
December California 5 Male B No 
 California 19 Female B No 
 California 24 Male A No 
 Maryland 15 Male B No 
 Missouri 9 Female A No
 North Carolina 12 Male B No
 New Jersey 10 Male B No 
 New Mexico 52 Male B No 
 Washington 17 Male A No 
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Table 2-5. Cases of wound botulism reported to the Botulism Surveillance System, by 
month, 2005 (N = 28) 
Month State Age (years) Sex Toxin Type Exposure* Death 
January California 38 Female A IDU No 
 Washington 37 Male A IDU Unknown
 Washington 50 Male A IDU Unknown 
February California 28 Male A IDU No 
March California 47 Male A IDU No 
 California 43 Male B IDU No 
 California 57 Male A IDU No 
 California 43 Male A IDU No 
 Washington 34 Female A IDU No 
May California 51 Female A IDU No 
June California 40 Male A IDU No 
July California 48 Male A IDU No 
 California 38 Male B IDU No 
 California 53 Male Unknown† IDU No 
 California 35 Male A IDU No 
August California 43 Male A IDU No 
 California 49 Male A IDU No 
 California 51 Male A IDU No 
 California 34 Male A IDU No 
 California 50 Female A IDU No 
September California 30 Male A IDU No 
 California 51 Male A IDU No 
 California 53 Female A IDU No 
 California 36 Male A IDU No 
October California 56 Male A IDU No 
 California 36 Male A IDU No 
November California 46 Male A IDU No 
 Washington 51 Male A IDU No 
*IDU = injecting drug user
† Serum quantity not sufficient for toxin typing 
Table 2-6. Cases of botulism, other, reported to the Botulism Surveillance System, 2005 (N= 3) 
Month State Age (years) Gender Toxin Type Exposure Death 
March Montana 56 Female F (C. baratii)* Adult intestinal; gardening No 
soil  
June Illinois 84 Female F(C. baratii)* Unknown Yes 
September Texas 74 Female A Unknown No 
*Botulinum toxin Type F produced by Clostridium baratii 
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Escherichia coli, Shiga Toxin-Producing non-O157 
The surveillance case definition for Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) is available 
at http://www.cdc.gov/EPO/DPHSI/casedef/escherichia_coli_current.htm. Shiga toxin-
producing Escherichia coli (STEC) strains cause diarrhea and hemolytic uremic syndrome 
(HUS). The most common STEC that causes illness in the United States is E. coli O157:H7. 
Non-O157 STEC strains are also important pathogens; they have caused several U.S. outbreaks 
and, in some U.S. studies, they have been isolated from diarrheal stools as frequently as E. coli 
O157:H7. STEC is indicated as enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli (EHEC) in the Nationally 
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) for 2005.   
In June 2000, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) passed a position 
statement recommending inclusion of E. coli O157 and non-O157 STEC that cause human 
illness as nationally notifiable. Reporting of non-O157 STEC has increased every year since 
implementation in 2001.  
During 2005, 501 cases of non-O157 STEC were reported through NNDSS. To better 
understand the non-O157 STEC serogroups associated with human illness, CDC encourages 
state health laboratories to forward suspected non-O157 STEC isolates to the CDC’s National 
Escherichia coli Reference Laboratory, where confirmatory testing for Shiga toxin genes and 
serotyping are offered. In 2005, 348 isolates were received by CDC from 39 states (Figure 3-1). 
The non-O157 isolates received by CDC in 2005 included 29 different O groups. The 
predominant groups were O26 (24%) and O103 (17%), followed by O111 (13%), O45 (8%), 
and O121 (7 %). These five O groups made up 69 % of all isolates (Table 3-1). E. coli O26 
was also the most commonly isolated non-O157 STEC in 2004 and 2003. In 2001, E. coli O111 
was the most common.   
Identification of an STEC requires demonstrating the ability of the E. coli isolate to produce 
Shiga toxin. Before 1995, Shiga toxin was detected by using highly technical assays available 
only at reference and research laboratories. Since 1995, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) has licensed several rapid enzyme immunoassays (EIA) for the detection of Shiga toxin 
in human stool specimens and culture broth. Since these EIA kits have become commercially 
available and the use of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to identity toxin genes has increased, 
the number of non-O157 STEC isolates sent to CDC for serotyping has increased each year. 
Healthcare providers evaluating patients with diarrhea or HUS should consider infection with 
non-O157 STEC in addition to E. coli O157. A small number of persons have developed HUS 
after urinary tract infection with STEC strains; in these cases, urine culture has yielded the 
pathogen when stool culture was negative. 
Healthcare providers should notify clinical diagnostic laboratories when STEC O157 infection 
is suspected so that appropriate testing methods can be applied. Clinical laboratories should 
strongly consider including STEC O157 in their routine bacterial enteric panel (with 
Salmonella, Shigella, and Campylobacter). The best way to identify all STEC infections is to 
screen all stool samples submitted for routine enteric bacterial testing for Shiga toxins using 
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EIA or PCR. Ideally, the clinical diagnostic laboratory should culture simultaneously for STEC 
O157 (e.g., on a sorbitol-containing medium such as sorbitol MacConkey agar). Clinical 
diagnostic laboratories that use a Shiga toxin EIA but do not perform simultaneous culture for 
STEC O157 should culture all Shiga toxin-positive broths for STEC O157 as soon as possible 
and forward these isolates to a state or local public health laboratory for confirmation and 
subtyping. When a Shiga toxin-positive broth does not yield STEC O157, then broth culture 
should be forwarded to the state of local public health laboratory for identification of non-O157 
STEC. State and local public health laboratories should confirm the presence of Shiga toxin in 
broths and should attempt to obtain a STEC isolate. All non-O157 STEC isolates should be sent 
by public health laboratories to CDC for confirmation and further characterization.  
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Table 3-1. Serogroup of non-O157 STEC isolates from humans sent to National 
Escherichia coli Reference Laboratory and Epidemic Investigation and Surveillance 
Laboratory, 2005 
Serogroup Number Percent 
O26 83 23.9% 

O103 58 16.7% 

O111 44 12.6% 

O45 27 7.8% 

O121 26 7.5% 

O145 12 3.4% 

O91 8 2.3% 

O76 5 1.4% 

O177 4 1.1% 

O28 4 1.1% 

O118 3 0.9% 

O165 3 0.9% 

O112 2 0.6% 

O123 2 0.6% 

O153 2 0.6% 

O174 2 0.6% 

O63 2 0.6% 

O84 2 0.6% 

O22 1 0.3% 

O51 1 0.3% 

O69 1 0.3% 

O8 1 0.3% 

O87 1 0.3% 

O88 1 0.3% 

O116 1 0.3% 

O117 1 0.3% 

O126 1 0.3% 

O143 1 0.3% 

O181 1 0.3% 

Rough 20 5.7% 

Undetermined 26 7.5% 

Unknown 2 0.6% 

Total 348 100.0% 
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Figure 3-1. States that submitted non-O157 STEC isolates to CDC, 2005 (N = 39)*  
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* Data obtained from the National Escherichia coli reference Laboratory and the Epidemic 
Investigation and Surveillance Laboratory  
Note: Numbers on map indicate the number of isolates submitted for that state. 
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Listeria 
The listeriosis surveillance case definition is available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/EPO/DPHSI/casedef/listeriosis_current.htm. Infection with Listeria 
monocytogenes is characterized by fever and muscle aches, and sometimes nausea or diarrhea.  
The nervous system can be affected, resulting in meningitis and cerebritis, with symptoms such 
as headache, stiff neck, confusion or convulsions. Pregnant women, newborns, and adults with 
weakened immune systems are at greatest risk of developing listeriosis. Infection during 
pregnancy may be asymptomatic but can result in miscarriage, premature delivery, or infection 
of the newborn. 
Listeriosis has been a nationally reportable disease since 2000. Reports of listeriosis are 
submitted to CDC through NNDSS. There were 896 cases of listeriosis reported to NNDSS 
during 2005 (0.3 cases per 100,000 population). The rate of listeriosis was highest among 
neonates (1.6 cases per 100,000 population), followed by adults older than age 70 years (1.5 
cases per 100,000 population). More comprehensive surveillance data on listeriosis incidence 
rates are available in FoodNet reports at http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/. 
The Listeriosis Initiative is an effort to aid in investigations of future Listeria outbreaks and 
clusters. Timely isolation and subtyping of all isolates of L. monocytogenes and prompt 
interviews of patients are means to improving outbreak investigation. Data collected using a 
standard, detailed report form are maintained in a central database for rapid analysis in the event 
of an outbreak. These data can be used for case-control analysis of a cluster, where people with 
non-matching isolates serve as controls. Prompt data collection and analysis could allow earlier 
public health intervention during an outbreak. During 2004–2005, there were 131 forms 
submitted from eleven states. 
All isolates of Listeria should be submitted for subtyping to state or national laboratories. Public 
health professionals and health care providers should consider interviewing all cases of listeriosis 
using the standard interview form, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/documents/ListeriaCaseReportFormOMB0920-0004.pdf. 
Salmonella 
The Salmonella surveillance case definition is available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/casedef/salmonellosis_current.htm. The National Salmonella 
Surveillance System collects reports of isolates of Salmonella from human sources from every 
state. Salmonella isolates are submitted to the state public health laboratory by clinical 
diagnostic laboratories. The state and territorial laboratories confirm the isolates as Salmonella, 
perform serotyping according to the Kauffmann-White scheme, and report the data 
electronically through the PHLIS to EDEB. Unusual or difficult isolates are forwarded to the 
National Salmonella Reference Laboratory at CDC for further characterization or confirmation.  
These results are reported back to the state laboratory, where they are reported to CDC through 
PHLIS. Duplicates are removed from the file at the end of the year. Every 20th isolate is 
forwarded to the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System (NARMS) at CDC for 
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susceptibility testing. 
The capture of isolates in the National Salmonella Surveillance System is considered to be 
fairly complete. However, some Salmonella isolates may not be forwarded to public health 
laboratories, and therefore are not reported. In addition, irrespective of the surveillance system, 
many cases of Salmonella illness are not reported because the ill person does not seek medical 
care, the healthcare provider does not obtain a specimen for diagnosis, or the laboratory does 
not perform the necessary diagnostics tests. The results of surveillance reported here should be 
considered underestimates of the true number of infections. 
The reporting state represents the state where laboratory confirmation and serotyping were 
performed. In some instances, the reporting state is not the state of residence of the person from 
whom the isolate was obtained. For Salmonella serotype Typhi, only the first isolation in one 
year for each person is counted. 
A total of 36,184 Salmonella isolates were reported from participating public health laboratories 
in 2005. This represents a 12% decrease compared with 1995, and a slight increase compared 
with 2004 (1.4%). The national rate was 12.2 per 100,000 population.   
Similar to other years, children younger than age 5 years accounted for 20% of all Salmonella 
isolates. Less than 10% of isolates came from persons in each of the second through fifth 
decades of life, with lower proportions from persons in later decades of life. The distribution of 
isolates between the sexes was different, with a greater proportion of isolates from male than 
female infants and children, and a smaller proportion of isolates from male than female adults.  
The thirty most common serotypes of Salmonella in 2005 are listed in Table 4-1. These represent 
82% of all Salmonella isolates. The four most common serotypes in 2005 (Typhimurium, 
Enteritidis, Newport, and Heidelberg; 52% of all isolates) have been the most common serotypes 
since 1995, except for 2004 when serotype Javiana replaced Heidelberg as the fourth most 
common serotype (Figure 4-1). Serotype Typhimurium has been the most commonly isolated 
serotype since 1997, though Enteritidis was a very close second in 2005. Serotypes 
Typhimurium and Enteritidis have both declined substantially (28% and 34%, respectively) since 
1995; the total number of Salmonella isolates has also declined during this period, though not as 
substantially as serotypes Typhimurium and Enteritidis.   
Among the thirty most common serotypes in 2005, Salmonella Hadar has had the largest percent 
decline during the past decade. Serotype Hadar was the fifth most common serotype in 1995 and 
has steadily declined to the 21st most common serotype in 2005, a 75% decline in number of 
isolates. Serotype Poona has declined 63% since 1995, although most of the decline was between 
1995 and 1997. Salmonella Mississippi has had the most dramatic increase, 184% since 1995, 
most since 2002. Salmonella Newport had a large increase in numbers between 1997 and 2002, 
but has been declining since then. Similarly, serotype Javiana had substantial increases in 2003 
and 2004, but declined 25% in 2005. 
Salmonella serotype I 4,[5],12:i:- was introduced as the 18th most common serotype in 2002 and 
has increased in rank to sixth in 2005. The serotype has been tracked in the National Salmonella 
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Surveillance system since 1998, though many isolates were classified as only Subspecies I or 
Group B in the past. Since the 2003 Salmonella Surveillance Summary was published, we 
reexamined the surveillance data for 1995–2003 and were able to reclassify some isolates 
submitted in these years as I 4,[5],12:i:- based on additional data submitted. Recent efforts to 
correctly classify this serotype may be responsible for at least some of the increase in numbers. It 
is unknown how many of the 479 isolates reported as Subspecies I, Group B in 2005 could be 
this serotype. In 1998, this serotype was the fourth most commonly identified in Spain; genetic 
analysis of the Spanish isolates revealed a close relationship to serotype Typhimurium (1). Many 
U.S. isolates of this serotype were characterized by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) and 
the patterns submitted to PulseNet, the National Molecular Subtyping Network for Foodborne 
Disease Surveillance. The PFGE patterns for most serotype I 4,[5],12:i- isolates were closely 
related to serotype Typhimurium PFGE patterns, indicating that they are most likely variants of 
serotype Typhimurium.  
 A large proportion of serotype Typhimurium isolates were resistant to multiple antimicrobial 
drugs; in a 2004 national survey, 39% were resistant to one or more drugs and 23% had a five-
drug resistance pattern characteristic of a single phage type, DT104. Similarly, serotype Newport 
has emerged as a major multidrug-resistant pathogen. In 2004, 28 (15%) of 190 serotype 
Newport isolates submitted to the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System were 
resistant to at least seven of 17 antimicrobial agents tested, including extended-spectrum 
cephalosporins. Similar to other years, there were marked regional differences in the frequency 
of Salmonella isolates among serotypes. The rate of isolations by region has been followed 
closely for serotype Enteritidis as a means of assessing the impact of egg safety regulations and 
industry improvements. As indicated in Figure 4-2, serotype Enteritidis rates of isolation had 
been relatively high in New England, Mid-Atlantic, and Pacific regions, but have shown 
significant decreases since 1995. However, since 2003 all regions have had small increases in 
serotype Enteritidis rates of isolation. 
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Table 4-1. The 30 Salmonella serotypes most frequently reported to PHLIS, 2005 
Rank Serotype Number Percent 
1 Typhimurium* 6982 19.3% 
2 Enteritidis 6730 18.6% 
3 Newport 3295 9.1% 
4 Heidelberg 1903 5.3% 
5 Javiana 1324 3.7% 
6 I 4,[5],12:i:- 822 2.3% 
7 Montevideo 809 2.2% 
8 Muenchen 733 2.0% 
9 Saintpaul 683 1.9% 
10 Braenderup 603 1.7% 
11 Oranienburg 590 1.6% 
12 Mississippi 565 1.6% 
13 Infantis 505 1.4% 
14 Paratyphi B var. L(+) tartrate+ 460 1.3% 
15 Thompson 428 1.2% 
16 Agona 367 1% 
17 Typhi 348 1% 
18 Hartford 239 0.7% 
19 Stanley 224 0.6% 
20 Berta 209 0.6% 
21 Hadar 205 0.6% 
22 Bareilly 201 0.6% 
23 Anatum 197 0.5% 
24 Poona 196 0.5% 
25 Mbandaka 190 0.5% 
26 Panama 148 0.4% 
27 Litchfield 141 0.4% 
28 Sandiego 138 0.4% 
29 Schwarzengrund 138 0.4% 
30 Brandenburg 134 0.4% 
Subtotal 29,507 81.5% 
All other serotyped 3,841 10.6% 
Unknown 1113 3.1% 
Partially serotyped isolates 1684 4.7% 
Rough or nonmotile isolates 39 0.1% 
Subtotal 6,677 18.5% 
Total 36,184 100% 
* Typhimurium includes var. Copenhagen 
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Figure 4-1. Isolation rate per 100,000 population for the top four serotypes of 
Salmonella reported to PHLIS, 1970–2005 
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Figure 4-2. Isolation rate per 100,000 population for Salmonella Enteritidis reported 

to PHLIS, by region, 1970–2005 
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Shigella 
The Shigella surveillance case definition is available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/casedef/shigellosis_current.htm. The National Shigella 
Surveillance System collects reports of isolates of Shigella from every state. Shigella isolates 
are submitted to the state public health laboratory by clinical diagnostic laboratories. The state 
and territorial laboratories confirm the isolates as Shigella, perform subtyping, and report the 
data electronically through PHLIS to EDEB. Unusual or untypable isolates are forwarded to the 
National Shigella Reference Laboratory at CDC for further characterization or confirmation. 
These results are reported back to the state laboratory, where they are reported to CDC through 
PHLIS. Duplicates are removed from the file at the end of the year.  
The capture of isolates in the National Shigella Surveillance System is considered to be 
consistent. However, some Shigella isolates may not be forwarded or reported to state public 
health laboratories, and therefore are not captured. In addition, irrespective of the surveillance 
system, many cases of Shigella illness are not reported because the ill person does not seek 
medical care, the healthcare provider does not obtain a specimen for diagnosis, or the 
laboratory does not perform culture for Shigella. The results of surveillance reported here are 
therefore substantial underestimates of the true number of infections. 
The reporting state represents the state where laboratory confirmation and subtyping were 
performed. In some instances, the reporting state is not the same as the state of residence of the 
person from whom the isolate was obtained.  
There are four major subgroups and 44 recognized serotypes of Shigella that are differentiated 
from one another by their biochemical traits (such as ability to ferment mannitol) and antigenic 
properties (Table 5-1). 
A total of 10,484 Shigella isolates were reported from public health laboratories in 50 states 
in 2005 (Table 5-2). The national rate was 3.5 per 100,000 population. Similar to previous 
years, children younger than age 5 years accounted for 28.2% of all Shigella isolates. About 
34.2% came from persons aged 5–19 years, and 26.6% from persons aged 20–59, with lower 
proportions from persons in later decades of life. The overall distribution of Shigella isolates 
between the sexes was similar, with females accounting for 53.0% of persons from whom 
Shigella was isolated. Females accounted for more cases than males in all age groups except 
40–49 years (47.5% female). The female predominance was particularly evident among 
persons aged 20–29 years (67.7%). Among reported isolates of Shigella ﬂexneri, a male 
predominance is seen, particularly in the age groups 20–29 (57.3%), 30–39 (68.5%), 40–49 
(73.6%), and 50–59 (61.2%). Gender information was not reported for 7.0% of all isolates 
and age information was not reported for 5.6% of isolates.  
The frequency of reported subgroups, and the frequency of reported serotypes within these 
groups for all Shigella isolates are shown in Tables 5-2 and 5-3. Of the 10,484 isolates, 9,402 
(89.7%) were subgrouped. The relative proportions of subgroups remained constant, with 
subgroup D (S. sonnei) accounting for the largest percentage of isolates (74.4%), followed by 
subgroup B (S. ﬂexneri, 13.6%), subgroup C (S. boydii, 1.2%) and subgroup A (S. dysenteriae, 
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0.5%). Over the past decade, the numbers of reported Shigella isolates in subgroups A, B and 
C, and the proportions of all reported Shigella isolates caused by these three subgroups have 
declined. The number (1,082) and the proportion (10.3%) of all reported Shigella isolates that 
were not identiﬁed as belonging to a speciﬁc subgroup also decreased. 
Table 5-1. Classification of Shigella subgroups 
Subgroup Subgroup Serotypes Fermentation of D- Subgroup B Group 
Mannitol Antigens 
A S. dysenteriae 15 - -
B S. flexneri 8* + + 
C S. boydii 20 + -
D S. sonnei 1 + -
* Serotypes 1–5 are subdivided into 11 subserotypes 
Table 5-2. Shigella subgroups reported to PHLIS, 2005 
Rank Subgroup Number Percent 
1 S. sonnei 7,795 74.4% 
2 S. flexneri 1,430 13.6% 
3 S. boydii 124 1.2% 
4 S. dysenteriae 53 0.5% 
Subtotal 9,402 89.7% 
Unknown 1,082 10.3% 
Total 10,484 100.0% 
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Table 5-3. Rank and number of isolates of Shigella serotypes reported to PHLIS, 2005 
Rank Serotype Number Percent 
1 S. sonnei 7795 74.4% 
2 S. flexneri unspecified 838 8.0% 
3 S. flexneri 2 unspecified 108 1.0% 
4 S. boydii unspecified  91 0.9% 
5 S. flexneri 2a  88 0.8% 
6 S. flexneri 1 unspecified  86 0.8% 
7 S. flexneri 3 unspecified  51 0.5% 
8 S. flexneri 4 unspecified  50 0.5% 
9 S. flexneri 4a  47 0.5% 
10 S. dysenteriae unspecified  34 0.3% 
11 S. flexneri 1b  34 0.3% 
12 S. flexneri 3a  31 0.3% 
13 S. flexneri 6  28 0.3% 
14 S. flexneri variant y  26 0.3% 
15 S. flexneri 2b  17 0.2% 
16 S. flexneri 3b  17 0.2% 
17 S. boydii 2 11 0.1% 
18 S. boydii 1 8 0.1% 
19 S. dysenteriae 2 5 0.1% 
20 S. boydii 4  4 0.0% 
21 S. dysenteriae 3  4 0.0% 
22 S. dysenteriae 4 4 0.0% 
23 S. boydii 14 3 0.0% 
24 S. dysenteriae 1 3 0.0% 
25 S. flexneri 1a  3 0.0% 
26 S. boydii 10 2 0.0% 
27 S. boydii 15  2 0.0% 
28 S. boydii 20 2 0.0% 
29 S. flexneri 5 unspecified 2 0.0% 
30 S. boydii 8  1 0.0% 
31 S. dysenteriae 12 1 0.0% 
32 S. dysenteriae 3162-96  1 0.0% 
33 S. dysenteriae 6 1 0.0% 
34 S. flexneri 4b 1 0.0% 
35 S. flexneri 5a 1 0.0% 
36 S. flexneri 88-893 1 0.0% 
37 S. flexneri variant x 1 0.0% 
Subtotal 9,402 89.7% 
Unknown 1,082 10.3% 
Total 10,484 100.0% 
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Vibrio 
The cholera and vibriosis (non-cholera Vibrio species) surveillance case definitions are 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/casedef/cholera_current.htm and 
http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/casedef/vibriosis.htm. Infections with toxigenic Vibrio 
cholerae O1 and O139, the causative agents of cholera, have been reportable in the United 
States for many years. More recently, toxigenic V. cholerae O141 has emerged as a cause of 
illness, but it does not cause cholera and is not notifiable.  
The Cholera and Other Vibrio Illness Surveillance System (COVIS) was initiated by CDC, 
FDA, and the Gulf Coast states (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) in 
1988. CDC has maintained a database of reported Vibrio infections from humans in order to 
obtain reliable information on illnesses associated with Vibrio species. Participating health 
officials collect clinical data, information about underlying illness, history of seafood 
consumption, and exposure to seawater in the seven days before illness, and then conduct 
tracebacks of implicated oysters. This information has been used to educate consumers about 
the health risks of seafood, as well as to help determine host, food, and environmental risk 
factors. Since 1997, many other states have also reported Vibrio isolates. However, only 
toxigenic V. cholerae O1 and O139, the causative agents of cholera, were nationally notifiable 
during 2005; thus the true number of Vibrio isolates is greater than reported. CDC serotypes 
all V. parahaemolyticus isolates received from state health departments, and screens for 
cholera toxin production in all V. cholerae isolates. 
Results are summarized using CDC form 52.79, Cholera and Other Vibrio Illnesses 
Surveillance Report and presented in two categories: V. cholerae isolates that produce cholera 
toxin (referred to as toxigenic V. cholerae), and all other Vibrio isolates, including those V. 
cholerae isolates that do not produce cholera toxin. Results are presented separately for Gulf 
Coast states versus other states, to be consistent with previous reports. Additionally, results 
are presented by anatomic site of isolation. It is important to note that isolation of some Vibrio 
species from a patient with illness does not necessarily indicate causation. While many Vibrio 
species are well-recognized pathogens, the status of V. damsela, V. furnissii, V. metschnikovii, 
and V. cincinnatiensis as enteric pathogens is less clear. 
In June 2006, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) adopted a 
resolution to add all Vibrio species infections (vibriosis) to the list of nationally notifiable 
diseases reported to NNDSS. Reporting for vibriosis is in addition to and distinct from 
reporting of V. cholerae currently conducted through NNDSS. The position statement, 
“National Reporting for non-cholera Vibrio Infections (Vibriosis),” can be found at 
http://www.cste.org/PS/2006pdfs/PSFINAL2006/06-ID-05FINAL.pdf. In addition to 
reporting through NNDSS, CDC requests that states collect information using the standard 
surveillance form for COVIS available at http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/. 
Isolates of toxigenic Vibrio cholerae 
In 2005, 12 patients with toxigenic V. cholerae were reported (Table 6-1). Five patients were 
hospitalized, and no deaths were reported. All 12 patients were infected with toxigenic V. 
cholerae serogroup O1; no isolates of toxigenic V. cholerae O139 were identified. Infection 
was acquired during international travel in five isolated cases (three patients acquired 
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infection while traveling in Pakistan, and two patients traveled in the Philippines). Exposure 
to domestic seafood was the source of infection for four patients, two of whom were a 
husband and wife in Louisiana who ate crab and shrimp harvested from the Gulf Coast. The 
other two cases associated with domestic seafood were unrelated and occurred in patients 
who ate seafood acquired in Hawaii.  Source of infection was unknown for three cases in 
Guam, of whom two patients were related, but had brief contact with each other and did not 
share any meals in the two weeks before illness onset. They, however, did receive drinking 
water from the same municipal aquifer supply and ate finfish in the week before illness. The 
third patient in Guam reported eating tuna fish and shrimp, in the week before illness.   
Other Vibrio isolates (excluding toxigenic V. cholerae) 
In 2005, 578 Vibrio isolates, excluding toxigenic V. cholerae, from 546 patients were 
reported to the COVIS. Among patients for whom information was available, 232 (46%) of 
506 were hospitalized and 40 (8%) of 485 died. V. parahaemolyticus was isolated from 218 
(40%) patients, and was the most frequently reported Vibrio species. Of the patients infected 
with V. parahaemolyticus, 23% were hospitalized, and 1% died. V. vulnificus was isolated 
from 121 (22%) patients; 90% were hospitalized, and 26% died. The following sections 
provide further information on these non-toxigenic Vibrio isolates: 
Geographic location: In 2005, CDC received 219 (40%) reports of Vibrio illness from Gulf 
Coast states, 143 (26%) from Pacific Coast states, 151 (28%) from Atlantic Coast states 
(excluding Florida), and 33 (6%) from inland states (Figure 6-1). The most frequent Vibrio 
species reported from Gulf Coast states were V. vulnificus (39%), V. parahaemolyticus 
(23%), V. alginolyticus (11%), and non-toxigenic V. cholerae (11%) (Table 6-2). The most 
frequent Vibrio species reported from non-Gulf Coast states were V. parahaemolyticus 
(51%), V. alginolyticus (12%), V. vulnificus (11%), and non-toxigenic V. cholerae (10%) 
(Table 6-3). 
Anatomic site of isolation: Among the 578 Vibrio isolates, 243 (42%) were from stool, 105 
(18%) from blood, and 164 (28%) from wounds. In addition, 18 (3%) isolates were obtained 
from the ear, and 48 (8%) were from urine, sputum, or other sites. V. parahaemolyticus was 
the species most frequently isolated from stool (150 [62%] of 243 isolates from stool); V. 
vulnificus was the species most frequently isolated from blood (68 [65%] of 105 isolates 
from blood) and from wounds (51 [31%] of 164 isolates from wounds).   
Seasonality: The number of patients from whom Vibrio species was isolated had a clear 
seasonal peak during the summer months (Figure 6-2). The greatest frequency of cases 
occurred in August for Gulf Coast states and non-Gulf Coast states.   
Exposures: 153 (28%) patients reported having a wound either before or during exposure to 
Vibrio. Of those, 100 (65%) reported water activities such as swimming and boating, 34 
(22%) reported handling seafood, and 40 (26%) reported contact with marine wildlife. 
Excluding patients from whom Vibrio was classified as a wound, and among the 255 for 
whom a food history was available, 223(87%) reported eating seafood in the seven days 
before illness onset. Among the 86 who reported eating a single seafood item, 49% ate 
oysters (91% of whom consumed them raw), 10% ate shrimp, and 15% ate finfish (Table 6-
4). International travel in the seven days before illness onset was reported by 41 (9%) of 449 
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patients, for whom information was available.  
Laboratory: For reports where laboratory confirmation was available, the state public health 
laboratory confirmed the identification of 234 (97%) of 242 human Vibrio isolates. CDC 
received 126 isolates of V. parahaemolyticus from 115 patients. Of these, 111 were viable, 
and four were not viable. Of the viable V. parahaemolyticus isolates, 28 (25%) from 11 
health jurisdictions were serotype O4:K12 (Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Maine, 
Montana, North Carolina, New York State, New York City, Oregon, and Washington); 16 
(14%) isolates from seven states were serotype O3:K6 (Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Maryland, New Mexico, and Washington); 13 (12%) isolates from eight states 
were serotype O1:K56 (Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and 
Washington); and the remaining 54 isolates were one of 25 serotypes.   
Outbreaks: Illnesses following Hurricane Katrina were reported to COVIS from eight states 
(Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas).  
The species reported were 26 V. vulnificus (72%), 6 non-cholerigenic V. cholerae (17%), 3 
V. parahaemolyticus (8%), and 1 (3%) unidentified Vibrio species. For patients with 
available information, 20 (91%) of 22 were considered wound infections because they 
reported having a wound either before or during exposure to Vibrio. 
Table 6-1. Isolates of toxigenic V. cholerae reported to COVIS, 2005 
State Age Sex Onset Exposure Serogroup Serotype 
Hawaii 85 Female 4/8/2005 Domestic (seafood) V. cholerae O1 Ogawa 
Hawaii 34 Male 5/10/2005 Domestic (seafood) V. cholerae O1 Ogawa 
Montana 44 Female 8/2/2005 Travel in Pakistan V. cholerae O1 Inaba 
New York 44 Female 7/26/2005 Travel in Pakistan V. cholerae O1 Inaba 
Louisiana 43 Male 10/15/2005 Domestic (crab and shrimp) - Gulf Coast V. cholerae O1 Inaba 
Louisiana 46 Female 10/15/2005 Domestic (crab and shrimp) - Gulf Coast V. cholerae O1 Inaba 
Guam 32 Male 10/26/2005 Unknown V. cholerae O1 Ogawa 
Guam 29 Male 10/19/2005 Unknown V. cholerae O1 Ogawa 
Michigan 53 Male 11/3/2005 Travel in Pakistan V. cholerae O1 Inaba 
Michigan 34 Male 11/26/2005 Travel in the Philippines V. cholerae O1 Ogawa 
California 46 Male 12/22/2005 Travel in the Philippines V. cholerae O1 Ogawa 
Guam 26 Female 12/26/2005 Unknown V. cholerae O1 Ogawa 
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Table 6-2. Number of Vibrio illnesses (excluding toxigenic V. cholerae) reported to 
COVIS, by species, complications and site of isolation in patients from Gulf Coast 
states, 2005 
Complications* Site of Isolation 
Vibrio Species Patients Hospitalized Deaths Isolates Stool Blood Wound Other† 
N (%) n/N (%) n/N (%) N (%) 
V. alginolyticus 23 (11) 5/21 (24) 0/21 (0) 23 (10) 1 1 15 6 
V. cholerae  
(non-toxigenic) ‡ 23 (11) 12/20 (60) 3/19 (16) 23 (10) 12 5 1 4 
V. damsela 3 (1) 0/2 (0) 0/2 (0) 3 (1) 0 0 3 0 
V. fluvialis 11 (5) 7/11 (64) 2/11 (18) 12 (5) 5 2 4 1 
V. hollisae 3 (1) 2/3 (67) 0/3 (0) 3 (1) 1 0 1 1 
V. mimicus 4 (2) 2/4 (50) 1/4 (25) 4 (2) 3 0 0 1 
V. parahaemolyticus 50 (23) 17/44 (39) 2/46 (4) 52 (22) 20 4 21 7 
V. vulnificus 85 (39) 70/77 (91) 15/65 (23) 93 (39) 3 45 40 5 
Species not identified 9 (4) 4/9 (44) 0/8 (0) 9 (4) 5 0 1 3 
Multiple species§ 8 (4) 4/8 (50) 1/6 (17) 18 (8) 6 4 8 0 
Total 219 (100) 123/199 (62) 24/185 (13) 240 (100) 56 61 94 29 
* Denominators indicate patients for whom information is known. 
† Includes ear, endotracheal secretion, sputum, and urine. 
‡ Non-toxigenic V. cholerae. Includes non-toxigenic V. cholerae O1 (1 isolates) and other non-toxigenic  
V. cholerae [non-O1 non-O139] (22 isolates). 
§ V. parahaemolyticus and V. alginolyticus were isolated from two patients, V. parahaemolyticus and V. 
mimicus were isolated from one patient, V. parahaemolyticus and V. fluvialis were isolated from one patient, V. 
parahaemolyticus and an unidentified Vibrio species were isolated from one patient, V. parahaemolyticus and 
V. vulnificus were isolated from one patient, V. vulnificus and V. alginolyticus was isolated from one patient, 
and V. vulnificus and an unidentified Vibrio species were isolated from one patient. 
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Table 6-3. Number of Vibrio illnesses (excluding toxigenic V. cholerae) reported to 
COVIS, by species, complications, and site of isolation in patients from non-Gulf Coast 
states, 2005 
Complications* Site of Isolation 
Vibrio Species Patients Hospitalized Deaths Isolates Stool Blood Wound Other† 
N (%) n/N (%) n/N (%) N (%) 
V. alginolyticus 40 (12) 9/37 (24) 0/37 (0) 40 (12) 2 1 25 12 
V. cholerae  
(non-toxigenic) 3 33 (10) 14/31 (45) 2/28 (7) 35 (10) 19 10 4 2 
V. damsela 4 (1) 3/4 (75) 0/4 (0) 4 (1) 0 0 3 1 
V. fluvialis 17 (5) 8/17 (47) 1/17 (6) 17 (5) 12 2 2 1 
V. furnissii 2 (0.6) 2/2 (100) 1/2 (50) 2 (0.6) 1 1 0 0 
V. hollisae 4 (1) 3/4 (75) 0/3 (0) 4 (1) 4 0 0 0 
V. mimicus 6 (2) 3/6 (50) 1/6 (17) 6 (2) 3 0 2 1 
V. parahaemolyticus 168 (51) 29/155 (19) 0/155 (0) 168 (50) 130 3 22 13 
V. vulnificus 36 (11) 31/35 (89) 10/32 (31) 37 (11) 1 23 11 2 
Species not identified 10 (3) 3/9 (33) 0/9 (0) 10 (3) 6 1 1 2 
Other 1 (0.3) 0/1 (0) 0/1 (0) 2 (1) 1 0 0 1 
Multiple species§ 6 (2) 4/6 (67) 1/6 (17) 13 (4) 8 3 0 2 
Total 327 (100) 109/307 (36) 16/300 (5) 338 (100) 187 44 70 37 
* Denominators indicate patients for whom information is known. 
† Includes ear, peritoneal fluid, sinus, sputum, and urine. 
‡ Non-toxigenic V. cholerae. Includes non-toxigenic V. cholerae O1 (3 isolates), non-toxigenic V. cholerae 
O139 (1 isolate), and other non-toxigenic V. cholerae (non-O1 non-O139) (29 isolates). 
§ V. parahaemolyticus and V. alginolyticus were isolated from one patient; V. parahaemolyticus and V. fluvialis 
were isolated from two patients; V. parahaemolyticus and an unidentified Vibrio species were isolated from one 
patient; V. alginolyticus and V. fluvialis were isolated from one patient; and V. cholerae non-O1, non-O139, V. 
fluvialis, and V. vulnificus were isolated from one patient. 
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Table 6-4. Seafood exposure among patients with foodborne Vibrio infection (excluding toxigenic V. cholerae) who reported  
eating a single seafood item in the week before illness onset, 2005 
Mollusks Crustaceans 
Oysters Clams Mussels Shrimp Lobster Crab Crayfish 
Other 
Shellfish* Finfish† Total 
Ate (%) 42 (49) 3 (3) 1 (1) 9 (10) 1 (1%) 13 (15%) 2 (2%) 2 (2%) 13 (15%) 86 
Ate raw (%)  91 67 100 44 0 0 0 0 27 49 
* Other shellfish reported: scallops 
† Finfish reported:  ahi poke, cat fish, flounder, perch, red snapper, rockfish filet, salmon, sunfish, sushi, tuna, yellow fin, and whiting. 
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Figure 6-1. Number of patients with Vibrio isolates (excluding toxigenic V. cholerae) 
reported to COVIS, by state, 2005 (N = 546 patients) 
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Figure 6-2. Number of patients with Vibrio isolates (excluding toxigenic V. cholerae) 
reported to COVIS, by month of illness onset or specimen isolation, Gulf Coast states vs. 
other states, 2005 (N = 546) 
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Data Sources and Background 
CDC conducts national surveillance to define the magnitude and burden of diseases, to identify 
outbreaks or high risk groups so that preventive actions can be taken, and to track the 
effectiveness of control and prevention measures.  
The surveillance systems for different foodborne pathogens have evolved over time. There are 
many distinct surveillance systems, some managed by individual program areas (e.g., botulism 
surveillance), and others administered and used more broadly. 
National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) and the National Electronic 
Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) 
The origins of NNDSS date back to 1878 when Congress authorized the U.S. Marine Hospital 
Service to collect morbidity reports regarding cholera, smallpox, plague, and yellow fever from 
U.S. consuls oversees. Today, the NNDSS is operated by CDC in collaboration with the 
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologist (CSTE) and serves as a timely source of 
national disease data. NETSS is the software and electronic communication pathway by which 
NNDSS data reach the CDC; this whole system is often identified by the NETSS acronym. 
NETSS is administered by the CDC National Center for Public Health Informatics (NCPHI).  
There are several sources of NETSS surveillance information for individual infections. For 
many diseases, public health authorities at state health departments request or require that 
physicians and other health care workers report cases to the local health department. For some 
diseases, authorities also request or require clinical laboratories to report the identification or 
isolation of certain pathogens. These reports are summarized and forwarded to the state 
department of health, which then sends the information to CDC, if the disease is nationally 
notifiable. 
Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS) 
In addition to allowing public health authorities to track diagnosed cases of notifiable disease, 
sending pathogens isolated from patients to public health laboratories to confirm the identity of 
the organism and its subtype provides an additional public health benefit. This process can 
identify clusters of specific subtypes and link events from widely dispersed locations. An 
example is surveillance for serotype of Salmonella. In 1962, CDC, CSTE, and the Association 
of State and Territorial Public Health Laboratory Directors agreed to serotype Salmonella 
isolates and send the resulting information to CDC weekly. Eight states participated initially. 
Eventually, all 50 states began transmitting information through PHLIS, an electronic network 
tool developed in the 1980s. PHLIS collects laboratory surveillance information for a large 
number of pathogens (foodborne and non-foodborne). In 2004, it was administered by the 
Biostatistics and Information Management Branch of the Division of Bacterial and Mycotic 
Diseases, located in CDC’s National Center for Infectious Diseases. PHLIS information has 
been used to identify, investigate, and control outbreaks of salmonellosis and other foodborne 
diseases at local, regional, national, and international levels. 
Limitations Common to NETSS and PHLIS 
Most surveillance systems for foodborne and diarrheal diseases tend to underestimate the 
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burden of disease. Diseases that cause severe clinical illness are most likely to be reported 
accurately, if they were diagnosed by a physician. However, persons who have diseases that are 
clinically mild, and infrequently associated with severe consequences, might not seek medical 
care from a healthcare provider, and these diseases are never diagnosed. Even if these less 
severe diseases are diagnosed, they are less likely to be reported in surveillance systems. 
The information reported about each case is typically limited to age, sex, county of residence, 
date of diagnosis, and a small number of other variables. The degree of completeness of data 
reporting is also influenced by the diagnostic facilities available; the control measures in effect; 
the public awareness of a specific disease; and the interests, resources, and priorities of state 
and local officials responsible for disease control and public health surveillance. Factors such 
as changes in the case definitions for public health surveillance, the introduction of new 
diagnostic tests, or the discovery of new disease entities can cause changes in disease reporting 
that are independent of the true incidence of disease.   
Some important infections that are difficult to diagnose are not included in general surveillance.  
For example, the diagnosis of enterotoxigenic E. coli (ETEC) remains restricted to a few 
research and large public health laboratories, and tests for this pathogen are not performed in 
standard clinical laboratories. Surveillance systems cannot track infections by this cause of 
foodborne diarrheal illness. 
Limitations specific to NETSS and PHLIS 
NETSS is a passive surveillance system that relies on a mix of clinicians and laboratories that 
vary by state and by pathogen to report cases or pathogen isolations. The system includes cases 
that are diagnosed only clinically (on the basis of symptoms, signs and the epidemiological 
setting) as well as cases that are diagnosed by a definitive laboratory test. The willingness of 
clinicians to report cases varies from disease to disease, and the completeness and timeliness of 
reporting is problematic for some diseases. The data do not include the specific findings of the 
public health laboratory, such as a subtype, and therefore are not useful for detecting clusters of 
a particular subtype. The lack of subtyping for common pathogens makes detection of 
outbreaks difficult, especially those that are multi-jurisdictional. This is particularly true for 
Salmonella and Shigella infections. 
PHLIS, a public health laboratory-based surveillance system, is also limited as a passive 
system; it relies on clinical laboratories to send Salmonella and other isolates to the state public 
health laboratory for subtyping. For example, because there is no routine referral or subtyping 
of Campylobacter strains in the United States, state public health laboratories may report only 
those strains that they isolate themselves (e.g., from patients in public health clinics or from 
specimens collected in outbreak investigations). The number of Campylobacter isolates 
reported through PHLIS is typically a small fraction of the number that is diagnosed. The need 
to send an isolate from the original clinical laboratory to the state public health laboratory and 
the need for the state laboratory to do the serotyping means that reports may be delayed.  
Training and support are required to ensure that state laboratories have the specialized skills 
and reagents needed to perform serotyping or other subtyping methods. The PHLIS software, 
written first in the late 1980s, has not been fully integrated into other software used in the 
states, and its use requires training. 
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State-to-State Variations in Reported Cases 
There is substantial variation in the number of reported cases from one state compared to 
another, even when taking into account the differences in population sizes among states. One 
major source of variation is that a given disease may be reportable in one state but not in 
another, even for nationally notifiable diseases. Reporting requirements are under state 
jurisdiction. There may also be substantial variation from one state to another, depending on 
local resources, interests, and priorities. When more than one route is available for reporting 
surveillance data within the public health system, states may choose to use one or the other or 
more than one. For example, some state public health laboratories report E. coli O157:H7 
isolates that they receive for confirmation through PHLIS, and some state epidemiology offices 
report infections with this organism through NETSS.  
Some states may chose to submit reports on diseases for which they have collected information, 
but which are not nationally notifiable. These data indicate the interest and concern with that 
disease within that specific state, but are not part of the nationally notifiable disease system. 
In addition, there are substantial state-to-state and regional differences in the incidence of 
certain diseases. For example, PHLIS has demonstrated that some Salmonella serotypes are 
isolated with similar frequency in persons in all U.S. regions, while other serotypes are highly 
localized. The PHLIS Salmonella Surveillance System is a stable system that has been 
functioning well for several decades with full national participation, so these results are 
considered valid. 
Program-Specific Surveillance Systems 
Because both NETSS and PHLIS collect little information beyond very basic patient 
demographics (e.g., age, sex, race, place, and time) and pathogen characteristics (e.g. 
Salmonella serotype in PHLIS), EDEB collects more detailed information on individual cases 
for some diseases because this information is needed for accurate monitoring and effective 
intervention. The diseases included are botulism, typhoid fever, and cholera and Vibrio species 
infections. For botulism, typhoid fever, and cholera, reporting is nationwide. For the non-
cholera Vibrio species reporting is mainly through a surveillance alliance with the Gulf Coast 
states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas. Vibrio surveillance also includes voluntary 
reporting from many other states. These systems and their resulting databases are distinct and 
separate from each other and from NETSS and PHLIS. 
Botulism surveillance has unique attributes. Botulism is an extreme hazard that can be fatal if 
untreated, and it has caused rare but catastrophic foodborne outbreaks that are public health 
emergencies. CDC provides the antitoxin used to treat the illness, and releases it for treatment 
of suspected botulism from airport quarantine stations at the request of a state epidemiologist.  
Clinicians who suspect a patient has botulism can call their state health department or CDC to 
arrange emergency release through a 24-hour emergency response system. This drug release 
mechanism means that CDC gets immediate information about suspected cases of botulism, 
which functions as an early alert surveillance system. 
Though not formally part of a surveillance system, EDEB tracks the number and type of non-
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O157 Shiga toxin-producing E. coli received from public health laboratories around the 
country. Among public health and clinical laboratories in the United States, only CDC has the 
capacity to serotype and characterize a wide variety of these isolates. Thus, our collection of 
isolates is likely representative of those isolated and forwarded to public health laboratories. 
Surveillance at Selected Sites 
For nine foodborne infections, the most detailed and accurate surveillance information comes 
from Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet). In 2005, FoodNet included 
10 surveillance sites, each comprised of several counties within a state, or a whole state, and 
covering a population of approximately 44.5 million, or 15% of the U.S. population. FoodNet 
actively gathers information about nine infections or conditions, integrates it with available 
laboratory information, and also collects information about the severity and outcome of the 
illness. In addition, FoodNet also conducts population surveys to determine the burden of 
illness, and how many ill persons visited a physician and got tested, as well as surveys of 
clinical laboratories to determine which pathogens are sought. Because standard surveillance 
methods are used, FoodNet data can be used to compare rates of illness over time and from one 
site to another. 
Enhancements to Surveillance Systems 
Public health surveillance is an evolving effort. As new disease entities are identified and 
defined as public health problems, surveillance for them begins and improves. As better 
understanding leads to better prevention, cases may level off, decline, and ultimately disappear. 
On the list of nationally notifiable diseases, there are several that were once large public health 
problems, but are now rarely reported. The official list of nationally notifiable diseases changes 
in accordance with resolutions issued by CSTE. 
The methods and information obtained for surveillance also continue to evolve. Active 
surveillance in sentinel populations (such as FoodNet) can provide reliable and detailed 
information about detected infections and eliminate the undercount caused by lack of resources 
or reporting effort. However, this effort is expensive and cannot be applied everywhere. The 
ongoing revolution in biotechnology is bringing new subtyping and fingerprinting technologies, 
such as pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE), into state and local public health laboratories. 
PulseNet is a national network of public health and food regulatory agency laboratories 
coordinated by CDC; PulseNet participants use PFGE to characterize isolates of foodborne 
disease pathogens. Isolate DNA patterns generated by PFGE are submitted electronically to the 
PulseNet database at CDC, where they are analyzed to identify clusters of illness caused by the 
same pathogen subtype. This approach is enhancing our capacity to detect outbreaks rapidly, to 
link widely separated cases, and to track more precisely the results of specific control measures. 
New electronic reporting media have accelerated reporting and have made possible practical 
automated cluster detection algorithms, such as the Statistical Outbreak Detection Algorithm 
(SODA), which has been in operation using PHLIS data for Salmonella since 1995. CDC’s 
efforts to produce a new integrated surveillance system, which will bring information directly 
from the clinical laboratory into a public health database, should improve the timeliness and 
consistency of reporting for many diseases.  
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Sources and Contacts for Surveillance of Bacterial Foodborne and 
Diarrheal Diseases 
Many staff members both within and outside EDEB are responsible for foodborne and diarrheal 
diseases national surveillance. For the purpose of this report, EDEB national case surveillance 
activity is considered separate from foodborne outbreak surveillance, FoodNet, and the 
National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System for Enteric Bacteria (NARMS-EB). 
Information concerning FoodNet and NARMS is cited in the reference section. Surveillance for 
foodborne disease outbreaks is contained in the report from the EDEB Outbreak Response and 
Surveillance Team. Note also that EDEB activities concern bacterial pathogens. Surveillance 
information concerning viral and parasitic diseases is reported by Division of Viral and 
Rickettsial Diseases and the Division of Parasitic Diseases, respectively, and surveillance 
information regarding chemical intoxications is reported by the National Center for 
Environmental Health. 
Sources and Contacts for Surveillance of Bacterial Foodborne and Diarrheal Diseases 
System Cases Reported Contact Title CDC Division 
NNDSS/NETSS Clinical-case reporting of 
Campylobacteriosis, 
Botulism, EHEC, Hemolytic 
Uremic Syndrome, 
Listeriosis, Typhoid Fever, 
Salmonellosis, Shigellosis, 
Cholera 
Ruth Ann Jajosky Epidemiologist Integrated Surveillance 
Systems and Services 
PHLIS Laboratory-based reporting 
of STEC, Salmonella, 
Shigella 
Richard Bishop Analyst Foodborne, Bacterial, and 
Mycotic Diseases 
National 
Botulism 
Surveillance 
System 
Detail case information for 
all U.S. botulism cases, 
including foodborne, infant, 
wound, and other forms 
Jeremy Sobel Epidemiologist, EDEB Foodborne, Bacterial, and 
Mycotic Diseases 
Typhoid Fever 
Surveillance 
System 
Detailed case information for 
all U.S. typhoid fever cases 
Liz Blanton Epidemiologist, EDEB Foodborne, Bacterial, and 
Mycotic Diseases 
Vibrio 
Surveillance 
System 
Detailed case information for 
all U. S. cholera and other 
Vibrio species infections 
Martha Iwamoto 
(vibriosis) 
 Liz Blanton 
(cholera) 
Epidemiologist, EDEB 
Epidemiologist, EDEB 
Foodborne, Bacterial, and 
Mycotic Diseases
Foodborne, Bacterial, and 
Mycotic Diseases 
National 
Salmonella, 
Campylobacter, 
and Helicobacter 
Reference Lab 
Isolates received at CDC for 
serotyping and 
characterization 
Patricia Fields Chief, Enteric Diseases 
Laboratory Branch 
Foodborne, Bacterial, and 
Mycotic Diseases 
National E. coli, 
Shigella, 
Yersinia, and 
Vibrio Reference 
Lab 
Isolates received at CDC for 
serotyping and 
characterization 
Nancy Strockbine Team Lead, National 
E. coli, Shigella, 
Yersinia, and Vibrio 
Reference Lab 
Foodborne, Bacterial, and 
Mycotic Diseases 
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List of Acronyms 
BSO………………. . Biostatistics Office 
CDC………………... Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CSTE……………….. Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologist 
DFBMD…………… Division of Foodborne, Bacterial, and Mycotic Diseases 
EHEC………………. Enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli 
EIA…………………. Enzyme Immunoassays 
ETEC………………..Enterotoxigenic Escherichia coli 
EDEB………………. Enteric Diseases Epidemiology Branch 
FDA…………………Food and Drug Administration 
FoodNet……………..Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network 
HUS…………………Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome 
MMWR…………….. Morbidity Mortality Weekly Report 
NARMS-EB………... National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System for Enteric Bacteria 
NCID……………….. National Center for Infectious Diseases 
NETSS……………... National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance 
NNDSS…………….. National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
PCR………………… Polymerase Chain Reaction 
PFGE……………….. Pulsed-field Gel Electrophoresis 
PHLIS……………… Public Health Laboratory Information System 
SODA………………. Statistical Outbreak Detection Algorithm 
STEC……………….. Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli 
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CDC Internet sites relevant to Foodborne and Diarrheal Diseases 
For additional information about foodborne disease, please visit any of the following web sites: 
Case Definitions for Infectious Conditions under Public Health Surveillance 
http://www.cdc.gov/EPO/DPHSI/casedef/case_definitions.htm 
Causes of Foodborne Illness 
http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/foodborne_az.htm 
Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/ 
Division of Parasitic Diseases 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dpd/ 
DPDx (Identification and Diagnosis of Parasites of Public Health Concern) 
http://www.dpd.cdc.gov/dpdx/ 
Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/index.htm 
Division of Viral Hepatitis 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/hepatitis/index.htm 
Epidemiology Program Office, Division of Public Health Surveillance and Informatics 
http://www.cdc.gov/epo/index.htm 
Foodborne and Diarrheal Diseases Branch 
http://www.cdc.gov/ /foodborne/ 
Foodborne and Diarrheal Diseases Branch, Outbreak Response and Surveillance Team 
http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/ 
FoodNet (Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network) 
http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/ 
NARMS: Enteric Bacteria (National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System) 
http://www.cdc.gov/narms/ 
National Center for Infectious Diseases 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/ 
PHLIS (Public Health Laboratory Information System) Surveillance Data 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/phlisdata/ 
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PulseNet (National Molecular Subtyping Network for Foodborne Disease Surveillance) 
http://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/ 
Respiratory and Enteric Virus Branch 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/revb/index.htm 
Safe Water System 
http://www.cdc.gov/safewater/ 
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